The first workshop of Nuclear Security and Safeguards Project was held from February 22 to 24, in Mito and Tokai, Japan. This workshop was hosted by Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) of Japan.

Workshop Participants

The workshop was attended by 30 participants from 11 counties, namely Australia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Japan.

[ Opening Session ] The Workshop began with the opening remarks by Mr. Masakazu Murakami, Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) of Japan, Dr. Sueo Machi as FNCA Coordinator of Japan, and Mr. Masao Senzaki as Project Leader of Japan. These were followed by the presentation by Dr.Machi on the overview of FNCA activities and achievement and that by Mr. Senzaki on the introduction of the FNCA Nuclear Security and Safeguards Project, which is a new project from 2011FY. [ Lectures on Nuclear Security and Safeguards ] Mr. Kaoru Naito, President of, Nuclear Material Control Center, provided the overview of of the international framework for nuclear security. Mr. Davis Hurt, Head of IAEA Tokyo Regional Office, explained the trends in IAEA safeguards implementation 2012 and Mr. Yoshitaka Nagayama, MEXT, reiterated the importance of Additional Protocol (AP). [ The Session for Country Reports ] All participating countries reports on the performance status and policies on nuclear security and safeguards, then they discussed. The session for country reports and discussion served as a good opportunity for each participating country to acknowledge its performance status in nuclear security and safeguards. More importantly, common challenges for nuclear security and safeguards implementation were identified.

[ Round Table Discussion Sessions ] The round table discussion sessions covered the themes of nuclear security, safeguards, nuclear 3S, collaboration with the IAEA, the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN), and other multilateral frameworks, and human resource development (HRD) for nuclear security and safeguards. The discussions showed how important it is to share experiences and information among each member country in implementing nuclear security and safeguards. Each member country agreed to cooperate with each other for the enhancement of nuclear security and safeguards in collaboration with other multilateral frameworks effectively.

[ Technical Visit ]
The participants visited Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and observed J-PARC Materials and Life Science Experiment Facility, Physical Protection Exercise Field and Virtual Reality Training System.

Executive Summary

In response to the prospects of increasing use of nuclear energy and associated concerns about heightening risks of nuclear security and proliferation, the Nuclear Security and Safeguards Project was established in the FNCA framework in 2011. The project is aimed at sharing experience in, knowledge of, and information on nuclear security and safeguards implementation and exchanging views on policies, strategies and frameworks for better performances in these areas. Against this background the project is expected to:

1.	raise the awareness of the importance of nuclear security and safeguards;
2.	facilitate information sharing in these areas;
3.	promote capacity building efforts in these areas; and
4.	enhance the regimes of nuclear security and safeguards by sharing information on technical tools and requirements of nuclear security and safeguards.

With these missions in mind, the first workshop of the project was held from February 22 to 24, 2012 in Mito and Tokai, Japan. It covered the issues of nuclear security and safeguards from various angles in order to explore every possible way for the advancement of the missions. To this end, the workshop focused to:

1)	acknowledge the performance status of nuclear security and safeguards by understanding the requirements in these areas;
2)	identify challenges that need to be overcome for the enhancement of nuclear security and safeguards regimes;
3)	identify the areas to discuss further in the next year to achieve effective cooperation to strengthen these regimes; and
4)	make a plan of the activities for the next three years.

The workshop began with the opening remarks by Mr. Murakami from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) of Japan, Dr. Machi as FNCA Coordinator of Japan, and Mr. Senzaki as Project Leader of Japan. These were followed by the presentation by Dr. Machi on the overview of FNCA activities and that by Mr. Senzaki on the introduction of the FNCA project on nuclear security and safeguards.

Ensuing sessions were lectures on nuclear security and safeguards. The first lecture session provided a basic knowledge of the international framework for nuclear security. The next lecture session explained the recent developments in IAEA safeguards and its strategy and reiterated the importance of Additional Protocols. While both sessions served as a basis for the understanding of the core requirements for nuclear security and safeguards implementation, they also raised the awareness of challenges to be overcome in these areas including information gathering for Additional Protocol declarations, inappropriate understanding of physical protection requirements, and a lack of regulatory capacity for nuclear security and safeguards.

Subsequent sessions for country reports of 11 participating states served as a good opportunity for each member state to acknowledge its performance status in nuclear security and safeguards. More importantly, common challenges for nuclear security and safeguards implementation were identified, some of which were recognized as potential areas for cooperation activities of this project.

Round table discussion sessions covered the themes of nuclear security, safeguards, nuclear 3S, collaboration with the IAEA, the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN), and other multilateral frameworks, and human resource development (HRD) for nuclear security and safeguards and served to facilitate information- and experience-sharing in these areas. Particular progress was made in specifying the topics for further discussions and exploring ways for cooperation activities in the FNCA framework. These include:

i.	For nuclear security - To have a session to share the efforts to promote nuclear security culture - To have a session to share the experiences and good practices in nuclear security and expertise in contradictory concepts between nuclear security and safety
ii.	For safeguards - To have a session or workshop to share experiences of member states in AP implementation organized in collaboration between FNCA and APSN.
iii.	For nuclear 3S (safety, safeguards, and security) - (JAEA/ISCN) To request from the member states information on the authorities for safety, safeguards, and security of nuclear material and radioactive sources. Then, compile the collected information in a table and disseminate it to the member states.
iv.	For the collaboration with the IAEA, APSN, and other multilateral frameworks - To create a table that describes the schedule and covered themes of the activities of both FNCA and APSN. - To hold a joint workshop on the Additional Protocol (AP) as an open session in the next FNCA workshop in conjunction with APSN. (Same action mentioned in the safeguards part above)
v.	For human resource development (HRD) for nuclear security and safeguards - To continue discussing potential tools and methods for information sharing

Overall, the workshop was successful and full of productive discussions. It demonstrated that the Nuclear Security and Safeguards Project has the potential to play an important role enhancing these regimes in Asia. The project will serve as a mechanism for raising the awareness of their importance as well as a platform for knowledge- and experience-sharing for the enhancement of both. Challenges for the project to contribute to assuring nuclear security and safeguards in the region may include

1.	establishing a knowledge-sharing mechanism for the project activities,
2.	assisting outreach capabilities to political circles and other stakeholders in member states, and
3.	developing effective programs for the enhancement of nuclear security and safeguards in these states.

Outlines of the Session Contents of the Workshop

Overview of FNCA Activities and Achievement by Dr. Machi (FNCA Coordinator of Japan)
Dr. Machi introduced each project’s activities, pointing out some developments and achievements. Examples included the project on mutation breeding, insect resistant orchid, Cyclotron and PET (for cancer treatment), and human resource development.

Introduction of the Nuclear Security and Safeguards Project by Mr. Senzaki (Project Leader of Japan, JAEA/ISCN)
Mr. Senzaki first provided the background of the establishment of the Nuclear Security and Safeguards Project. The prospects of increasing use of nuclear material worldwide highlights the need to enhance nuclear security and safeguards by facilitating international cooperation. He then stated the objectives of the project as to share experience, knowledge, and information on nuclear security and safeguards implementation and to exchange views on policies, strategies and frameworks for nuclear security and safeguards. He identified the expected outcomes of the project regarding nuclear security and safeguards as to raise the awareness of their importance, to facilitate information sharing, to promote capacity building, to develop cooperation activities in the FNCA framework, and to enhance their implementation in Asia by sharing information on technical tools and requirements for better performances.

Session 1: Nuclear Security by Mr. Naito (President of Nuclear Material Control Center, Chairman of Advisory Committee on Nuclear Security, Japan Atomic Energy Commission)
Mr. Naito provided the overview of the international framework for nuclear security. He particularly emphasized the following three points as being important for assuring nuclear security:

1.	Adequate control of nuclear material is required to assure nuclear security;
2.	Adequate state infrastructures should be established and maintained in order to effectively implement the measures for accountancy and control of nuclear material, physical protection and export control; and
3.	Bilateral/ international outreach programs are available to assist States in this context.

Session 2: Safeguards by Mr. HURT (Head of IAEA Tokyo Regional Office)
Mr. Hurt explained the evolvement of IAEA safeguards concepts as follows.

1.	State-level concept began in the 1990s and continues to serve for safeguards implementation.
2.	A new document, "Conceptual Framework for Safeguards Implementation" will be issued soon. It is now planned to be a Safeguards Department Policy Paper. The Framework will define ten general principles that will be: - Differentiation without discrimination, - Effectiveness as priority not to be comprised by cost issues, - Full use of legal authority, - Risk management, - Full coverage of proliferation pathways, - Nuclear material accounting as the basis for detecting diversion, - Comprehensive information analysis, - Security and availability of information, - Transparency of process, and - Quality management.
3.	With these newly defined principles, some changes are expected that include: - The internal review and approval processes for IAEA's operating documents (State-level safeguards approach and an annual State-specific implementation plan ) will be improved; - The yearly safeguards evaluation process is supposed to change significantly; and - It is expected that the Safeguards Effectiveness Evaluation (SEE) section will not evaluate all facilities, but only some on a selective basis, while the operations divisions will do their own evaluation for the facilities for which they have responsibility.

Session 2: The Importance of AP by Mr. Nagayama (MEXT, Japan)
Mr. Nagayama reiterated the importance of Additional Protocols (AP), pointing out that it is very important for global security that countries with nuclear material and nuclear activities obtain international trust by enhanced transparency. The universalization of AP will contribute to regional and global security. He also explained the Japanese system of AP implementation. Lastly, he stated that the mission of ISCN in Japan is to contribute to strengthening nuclear safeguards and security, and that Japan would like to cooperate with FNCA in these areas.

Session 5: Country Report Summary by Mr. Ohkubo (Japan)

1.	The nuclear energy development situation has not changed dramatically: ROK and Japan are operating nuclear power plants, Bangladesh and Vietnam keep their nuclear power plant (NPP) plans, and some countries are preparing a concrete plan for NPP.
2.	The safeguards and security implementation status was provided (NPT, CSA, AP, IS, CPPNM, CPPNM Amendment, Nuclear Terrorism Convention).
3.	The situation of regulatory authority was summarized as follows. Not many states have completely independent regulatory authority. Many have semi-independent regulatory authority and some of these are considering and moving toward the establishment of completely independent regulatory authority.
4.	The following major challenges were identified. - Limited staffing and human resources - Underdeveloped legislation and regulation - Less developed nuclear security culture - 3S and independent regulatory authority
5.	Existing international and regional cooperation initiatives were identified. - Megaports Initiative (led by the U.S.) - IAEA Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP) - Integrated Regulatory Infrastructure Support Service (IRISS) (offered by ROK) - PP Upgrade Support (in cooperation with the IAEA, EU, the U.S. Japan) - Border control upgrade support (the U.S.) - Training courses (IAEA, Australia, Japan, ROK, Russia, U.S.) - Further Regional Cooperation: (ISCN training course, INSA (ROK) after 2014)

Session 6: Round Table Discussion on Nuclear Security
Lead Speech by Mr. Chung (Republic of Korea: ROK)
Mr. Chung explained the background of Seoul Nuclear Security Summit and described the significance and objectives of the Summit. He also introduced two major events in conjunction with the Summit.

Summary of the Discussions in the Session 6

1.	The required framework for nuclear security was discussed.
2.	The need for sharing experience in and knowledge of nuclear security implementation was recognized, particularly in the area of human resource development in this area.
3.	The difficulties in exchanging views on nuclear security policies and strategies were mentioned.
4.	Challenges and needs in the development of the required infrastructure were identified that include regulatory infrastructure, transboundary issues, technical competency, and the establishment of security culture. These suggest a need for knowledge-sharing in nuclear security infrastructure development.
5.	The difficulty of assuring the security of radioactive sources was identified.
6.	The potential role of the FNCA framework to strengthen nuclear security was discussed. In this regard, various possible ways of regional cooperation in enhancing nuclear security were explored.
7.	The important role of this FNCA project for strengthening of nuclear security was recognized. Potential ways to facilitate regional cooperation (training courses, workshops) were discussed.
8.	Indonesia proposed that the development of a regional Design Basis Threat (DBT) be considered.
9.	Proposed Actions to Take (by Indonesia): The following actions were agreed upon: - To have a session to share the efforts to promote nuclear security culture - To have a session to share the experiences and good practices in nuclear security and the expertise in contradictory concepts between nuclear security and safety.

Session 7: Round Table Discussion on Nuclear Safeguards
Lead Speech by Mr. Hurt (IAEA)
Mr. Hurt identified minimum requirements as well as recommended infrastructure for safeguards implementation. He also suggested possible areas for cooperation, including experience (good and bad) sharing, joint training, collaboration on SG policies, and joint equipment development.

Summary of the Session 7: Round Table Discussion on Nuclear Safeguards

1.	Knowledge on required infrastructure (legal, technical, etc.) for safeguards implementation was shared.
2.	The need for technical expertise to verify nuclear material received from vendors was identified.
3.	The importance of AP implementation was emphasized, but difficulties in verifying information received from universities and research institutes and in making the initial declarations were mentioned. In this regard, international support is recognized as essential.
4.	The lack of expertise within national authorities in conducting safeguards inspections was identified.
5.	It was agreed that political commitments are crucial for AP ratification, and that technical knowledge of AP requirements are essential for AP implementation. In this regard, sharing the experiences in AP implementation was recognized as important.
6.	Proposed Actions to Take: The following action was agreed upon: - FNCA and APSN will collaborate to organize a session or workshop to share experiences from member states in implementing AP.

Session 8: Round Table Discussion on Nuclear 3S (Safety, Safeguards, Security)
Lead Speech by Mr. Senzaki (Japan)
Mr. Senzaki reiterated the importance of nuclear 3S and the need to consider interfaces and synergetic effects among 3S to improve the performance in these areas. He also identified the issues to consider when implementing an integrated approach of 3S and how to develop this approach.

Summary of the Session 8: Round Table Discussion on Nuclear 3S (Safety, Safeguards, Security)

1.	The importance of assuring nuclear 3S was recognized and most participants shared their experiences in assuring nuclear 3S.
2.	The lack of nuclear safety experts' understanding of the implementation of nuclear security and safeguards was identified. In this regard, it was suggested to promote this understanding in nuclear safety conferences.
3.	The importance of coordination of the efforts of different actors in nuclear safety, security and safeguards was recognized and identified as a challenge to overcome.
4.	The importance of communicating with security people including police and intelligence people on nuclear security issues was mentioned.
5.	The Fukushima accident gave a lesson on the need for an integral approach to safety, security, and safeguards. However, the challenges are to find out what synergy effects can be achieved by taking account of interfaces and to determine an appropriate balance between contradicting concepts between nuclear security and safety.
6.	Nuclear 3S by design and 3S culture were identified as topics worth considering.
7.	The need for regulatory and operational capacity building for the security of nuclear material and radioactive sources was recognized.
8.	Thailand shared the outcomes of the 3S conference which was held in Bangkok in 2011 as the 50th anniversary of the establishment of OAP (Office of Atoms for Peace). These include a commencement of the cooperation network on nuclear 3S of ASEAN countries, ASEANTOM. This network is expected to involve not only technical persons but also policy ones.
9.	Nuclear forensics was identified to be a part of nuclear security efforts. A planned international support program to identify core capabilities in this field was introduced.
10.	Proposed Actions to Take: The following action was agreed upon to foster better coordination among different actors in nuclear 3S: - (JAEA/ISCN) To request information from the member states on authorities for safety, safeguards, and security of nuclear material and radioactive sources. Then, to compile the collected information in a table and disseminate it to the member states.

Session 9: Round Table Discussion on Collaboration with the IAEA, APSN, and Other Multilateral Frameworks
Lead Speech by Dr. Everton (Australia)
Dr. Everton explained the objectives of the Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network (APSN), its membership and observers, scope, recent developments (including the establishment of working groups, a web site for information sharing, and the completion of a survey on safeguards training needs and capacities), and scheduled activities and projects. He also emphasized APSN's potential role to build regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.

Summary of the Session 9: Round Table Discussion on Collaboration with the IAEA, APSN, and Other Multilateral Frameworks

1.	It was agreed that FNCA activities in the field of nuclear security and safeguards need to be enhanced through the collaboration with the IAEA, APSN and other multilateral frameworks.
2.	For securing cooperation with the IAEA, this FNCA project is expected to make an official letter addressed to the Director General of the IAEA requesting IAEA's regular participation in the activities of the project. The letter needs to state the scope of consultation, coordination and assistance expected from the IAEA.
3.	The scope of IAEA assistance is expected to be expert assistance. The assistance includes the provision of a lecture on the detailed requirements of AP declarations and minimum requirements for the development of national infrastructure for nuclear security, information-sharing about capacity building support, and training opportunities for nuclear security and safeguards.
4.	Funding for the IAEA's participation is another issue to consider. Member State Support Programs may possibly be utilized as safeguards training programs are usually carried out through Member State Support Programs. In this context, the provision of safeguards inspector training by the IAEA may be possible for FNCA member states, for example by using nuclear facilities in Japan or ROK. However, this needs further discussion and consultation with the IAEA for the availability and duration of such training.
5.	It was agreed that coordination of activities within the FNCA framework and with APSN on safeguards is a necessity. The following points are identified as important for the coordination with APSN. a. Communication needs to be more closely linked to the activity schedule and themes to prevent duplications. b. Coordination is needed to avoid duplications in the activities in FNCA and APSN to improve effectiveness and to save costs.
6.	Proposed Actions to Take: The following actions were agreed upon for the coordination with APSN. a. To create a table that describes the schedule and covered themes of the activities of both FNCA and APSN. b. To hold a joint workshop between APSN and FNCA on AP implementation as an open workshop of the next FNCA workshop (or with the plenary meeting of APSN).

Session 10: Round Table Discussion on Human Resource Development (HRD) for Nuclear Security and Safeguards
Lead Speech by Mr. Naoi (Japan)
Mr. Naoi introduced the capacity building support activities of the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN) of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). He explained plans to develop the support programs and proposed that the ISCN would serve as a platform for capacity building of the member states in the areas of nuclear security and safeguards.

Summary of the Session 10: Round Table Discussion on Human Resource Development (HRD) for Nuclear Security and Safeguards

1.	The need to develop a "Train-the-Trainers" program was identified.
2.	The importance of outreach activities that extend to the political circle and relevant stakeholders was recognized.
3.	It was proposed to consider inviting experts from Asian countries to training courses as lecturers.
4.	It was clarified that HRD is, in principle, a national program and that each state needs to have a responsibility to develop its own strategy for HRD.
5.	Information sharing on training opportunities through E-mail and each website was recognized as a good idea. Also, information sharing on legal instruments was also suggested.
6.	It was proposed to consider utilization of the FNCA website for information sharing.
7.	JAEA introduced its plan to update its SSAC training course. It will be expanded to cover physical protection components, Additional Protocols, and the need for the member states to ratify APs.
8.	It was noted that the duration of training courses should be flexible to accommodate the needs of partner states.
9.	The need for information management of nuclear issues was identified.
10.	Proposed Actions to Take: The following action was agreed upon for the HRD: - To continue discussing potential tools and methods for information sharing.

Australia

Bangladesh

Indonesia

Japan

Kazakhstan

Republic of Korea

Malaysia

Mongolia

The Philippines

Thailand

Vietnam

IAEA