Sessions 1: Country Report Summary

Moderator:
Dr. Abid Imtiaz, Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission (BAEC), Bangladesh

The compilation of the country report summary that included the updates on the developments and improvements since the 2020 Workshop regarding the implementation of safeguards and nuclear security, the promotion of nuclear security culture and capacity building activities was presented by Mr. OKUDA Masahiro, Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security, Japan Atomic Energy Agency (ISCN/JAEA), Japan. It was emphasized that the Philippines ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) Amendment in 2021. The Summary is attached to this report as "Country Report Summary." The updated Country Report Summary will be posted on the FNCA website.

Session 2: Nuclear Security (Stakeholder Matrix)

Moderator:
Mr. Khairul, National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN), Indonesia

Presentation were delivered by Japan and Australia
1) Ms. NORO Naoko, ISCN/JAEA, Japan
Ms. Noro presented the progress of nuclear security stakeholder matrix that have been filled by some FNCA members countries. It was proposed for 2021-2023 FNCA Nuclear Security and Safeguards Project. She mentioned that "Nuclear security stakeholder matrix project" have submitted to the FNCA Secretariat by Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Philippines, and Thailand. She thanked those countries for trying to develop the Matrix. In that regard, she invited these countries to share the good practices and lessons learned on matrix development, focusing on the following points; stakeholders involved for matrix development (if any); any challenges to find the relevant information; and who FNCA should reach out more to strengthen capacity in nuclear security.
During session discussion, some countries said that the stakeholder matrix was filled together with other institution. Another speaker pointed out that this matrix will expedite of its distribution to another stakeholder if the FNCA Coordinator Japan could address this issue during FNCA ministerial meeting, where high level within FNCA Member Countries will presence at that important meeting. This comment answers question from Ms. Noro, who FNCA should reach out to enhance/build capacity.
Ms. Noro also shared lessons learned from Japan's experience in filling nuclear security stakeholder matrix, it was hard for a single party (such as ISCN) to identify all the stakeholder on nuclear security within the country. Because nuclear security is the responsibility of the state, meaning that multiple security organizations must also understand their responsibilities for nuclear security. She added that the national infrastructure also change over time. To identify the gaps, input on responsibilities and capabilities should be specific and detailed in the matrix.
As in the lessons from Japan, the stakeholders of radioisotope security (RI) may need to reach out more to build and improve the capacity of the security of radioactive sources. The members discussed the next step as follows:

1. Follow-up technical meeting to develop a national nuclear security Matrix: Summer-Fall 2022
2. Holding an open seminar to share good practices and lessons learned on Matrix: 2023 Workshop.

2) Ms. Kaitlyn Toole, ANSTO, Australia
In this session, Ms. Kaitlyn Toole described about ANSTO experience in fostering nuclear forensics within the country. She also explained about nuclear forensics engagement with national, regional and international level as well with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Ms. Toole explains the Australian landscape in the field of nuclear security, and describes the three organizations involved with nuclear materials and radioactive sources and nuclear emergency preparedness and response. For the issue of Safeguards and security of nuclear facilities, it is under the Australian Safeguard and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) organization. In terms of safety of radioactive sources and emergency response for the Commonwealth is under the coordination of the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA) organization.
The two bodies mentioned above are respectively the regulatory agency for nuclear materials and the regulatory agency for radioactive sources and emergencies preparedness and response.
Regarding the development of nuclear forensics in Australia, she explained the speech of her head of state at the second nuclear security summit in 2012 in Seoul, South Korea.
Australian Prime Minister's Speech during the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul:
"We are leading the development of forensic science and technologies to improve detection of illicit nuclear materials"
Ms. Toole explained the nuclear forensics team under ANSTO and its activities carried out at the national, regional and joint levels with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The involvement of ANSTO's nuclear forensics together with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), among others, in government forums, including: conferences and technical meetings, training activities, technical meetings, then contributions to IAEA security guidelines.
ANSTO nuclear forensics also supports working group activities together with the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). Ms. Toole said that ANSTO nuclear forensics collaborated with a number of countries in Southeast Asia Countries such as the Philippines (PNRI), the Republic of Korea (KINAC), Japan (JAEA), Indonesia (BATAN). Furthermore, ANSTO and the IAEA began planning regional level nuclear forensics training in November 2022 (contingent on COVID restrictions).
For domestic nuclear forensics, ANSTO provides Support to ACT policing in handling case studies. She explained about the joint statement of nuclear forensics on nuclear security with the IAEA into INFCIRC/917. The Australian Government expects the IAEA member countries to support this joint statement by subscribing to INFCIRC/917.

Session 3: Safeguards (Good Practice on Export Controls and AP declaration)

Moderator:
Ms. Harinate Mungpayaban, Office of Atoms for Peace (OAP), Thailand

The presentation was delivered by Republic of Korea
Ms. Jongsook Kim, Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC)/ International Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security Academe (INSA), Republic of Korea

In this session, Professor Kim presented the Good Practice on Export Controls and AP Declaration in Korea. In order to fulfil the obligations of AP declaration properly, a state export control system is essential. In this context, Korea strategic export control system had been explained briefly along with AP implementation in Korea.
Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (MOTIE) for the dual-use items, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) for munition list, and the Nuclear and Security Commission (NSSC) for the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Trigger List are main licensing authorities. NSSC is also responsible for safeguards implementation in Korea as the Safeguards Regulatory Authority (SRA). Other administrative agencies like Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Korea Customs Service, and the National Intelligence Service are engaged in export control matters in various ways.
Ms. Kim introduced the licensing review procedures, requirements and conditions for issuing export license. Also the MOTIE and NSSC maintain each separated technical support organizations and web-based e-licensing system; Korea Strategic Trade Institute (KOSTI) as Technical Support Organization, Yestrade as e-licensing system, and KINAC and Nuclear Export Promotion Service (NEPS).
Regarding the declarations in AP Article 2.a., Ms. Kim emphasized the importance of raising awareness of the safeguards stakeholders such as nuclear facility operators, researchers and academia people. In this context, governmental efforts to the integrity and full adherence of AP declaration obligations had been started from the signing the AP in 1999 and keep going to present. As an example, the NSSC provides the web-based AP Reporting systems not only for PC version, but for mobile version order to serve licensees and stakeholders who report the Article 2.a. related information to the SRA.

Online Exercise: Export Control under AP

Facilitator:
Ms. Jongsook Kim, KINAC, Republic of Korea
Mr. OKUDA Masahiro, ISCN/JAEA, Japan,

As a special event at the workshop, the scenario-based online exercise on Export Control under AP was provided and facilitated by Ms. Jongsook Kim and ISCN/JAEA.

Mr. NAOI Yosuke, Project Leader of Japan, delivered the closing remarks and encouraged collaboration among the FNCA members to achieve the objectives of this project. After the closing remarks, the Workshop was officially closed.

Attachment

1. Agenda
2. List of Participants
3. Summary of Country Reports

Online Open Seminar

As online open seminar, Mr. NAOI Yosuke (Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA)), the FNCA Nuclear Security and Safeguards Project of Japan, made a presentation.

For inquiries concerning this presentation, please find contact information as below.(until March 31, 2022)