FNCA2007 Workshop on Nuclear Safety Culture
The workshop was opened by Prof SUN Yuliang (Tsinghua University) who welcomed the participants and outlined the context for the workshop.
Mr Simon Bastin (ANSTO) replied, welcomed guests and delegates on behalf of ANSTO and thanked the hosts for their preparation.
Dr Tsutomu Yokoyama (JNES) replied and reiterated thanks to the hosts and delegates.
A list of participants is given in Appendix 1.
The agreed agenda is given in Appendix 2.
Highlights of the Project
Prior to the workshop, participants were asked to complete a survey outlining the main highlights of the project for their country or institute, and possible suggestions for a replacement project.
Mr Bastin gave a brief presentation on the original aims, achievements, and developments of the project.
Most countries then gave a presentation on the highlights of the project from their perspective either on behalf of their country or institute.
The survey responses received are attached in Appendix 3.
A collation of the highlights is given in the Final Project Report (Appendix 4).
It was apparent that over the eleven years of the project, significant positive impacts had been made in the various countries and institutes to promote strong safety culture, the most significant impact being the self assessments and peer review process.
Thailand outlined a national vision for a nuclear power program.
Status report on progress on recommendations arising from past Peer Reviews
Mr Pham (DNRR), Dr Lim (KAERI), Mr Situmorang (BATAN) and Dr Wahab (Nuclear Malaysia) gave presentations on the status of progress on the recommendations of their respective Peer Reviews.
Mr Pham reported that since the 2003 Peer Review of the DNRR, of the 16 recommendations, all are now closed since the installation of a new control system in 2007.
Dr Lim reported that since the Peer Review of the HANARO reactor facility in 2004, of the 32 items from 15 recommendations, 97% are now closed out.
Mr Situmorang reported that since the Peer Review of the Kartini Reactor Facility in 2005, of the 21 items from 14 recommendations made, 78% have been closed out.
Dr Wahab reported that since the Peer Review of the PTR in 2006, 92% of the 37 items from 16 recommendations 92% have now been closed out.
A summary table of progress at each workshop is given in the table below.
(1st peer review)
20 items of recommendations
(2nd Peer Review)
32 items of recommendations
(3rd Peer Review)
21 items of recommendations
(4th Peer Review)
37 items of recommendations
The Workshop participants thanked Viet Nam, Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia for their reports and expressed their appreciation for the progress that has been made and the commitment of their organisations to continue to act on the recommendations. Viet Nam's success in obtaining funding (from IAEA TC funds and the Viet Nam government) for the close out of its remaining recommendations (including the replacement of the reactor control system) warrants special mention.
As a followup to a presentation given by Mr Satoshi Kurata (Chubu Electric Power Co) at the last workshop, Dr Yokoyama gave a presentation on 14 key elements of safety culture that will form a self assessment and monitoring framework for regulatory inspections in Japan. The 14 elements are as follows:
- Top management's commitment
- Senior managers' clear policy and actions
- Systems to prevent wrong decision
- Questioning attitude
- Reporting culture
- Good communication
- Accountability and transparency
- Compliance with rules
- Learning organization
- Proactive prevention of trouble/accident
- Self assessment or third-party audit
- Work management
- Control of change/modification
- Attitude and motivation
Each of these aspects was presented with the overall viewpoint, example questions to ask and example performance indicators. It was observed by the group that some of the elements and example questions were evolutions of the ASCOT guidelines which have formed the basis of good safety culture performance indicators.
Options for the future
Those participants who had made suggestions as to possible suggestions for a replacement project, gave a brief presentation on their respective suggestion.
Dr Kosaka presented options (1) to essentially continue the existing project and peer review process (2) Re-scoping or focusing on a specific area(s) of safe operations and maintenance of RRs ( the specific area is to be determined but could be part of the initial phase of the project).
Dr Lim presented his suggested topic of knowledge management in nuclear research facilities. It was agreed that the focus should be on safety implications of knowledge management and on the emphasis should be on the people and methods rather than systems. Interviews with retiring people could be an option to enhance the review process.
Dr Wahab presented his suggested topic of Operational Safety of Research Reactors. The project could work similarly to IAEA OSART missions for NPPs but customised for Research Reactors. An issue to be resolved is how such a project would fit with the IAEA service called INSARR.
Mr Sudprasert presented his suggested topic of ageing management of research reactors. Three areas: coping with the additional level of maintenance required for ageing plant; safety implications of the increased likelihood of failures (including different modes of failure) of ageing plant; and life-limiting issues of aged critical items of plant. Discussions centred around whether an FNCA project was the best way to deal with such issues as it requires special experts, although it was recognised that peer review missions could identify the need and promote or trigger the request for support from international agencies/experts.
Mr Situmorang presented his suggested topic of safety culture review, based on the SCART guidance. Essentially this would be the same project but with revised safety culture areas based on the draft revised IAEA SCART mission services document and IAEA GS-G-3.1. An issue to be resolved is how such a project would fit with the IAEA service called SCART.
Mr Bastin presented his suggested topic of safety management system for research reactors.
The workshop discussed the pros and cons of each of these topics as shown in the table below.
|Continue Safety Culture Project with some re-scope and taking into account new documents
||Continuity with minimal transition, building on successes of past project;
Reassess facilities already reviewed;
Invite countries not yet peer reviewed;
|Long timeframe of existing project;
Need for new ideas;
Need for justification;
Need to establish new goal;
Possible overlap with IAEA SCART service.
|Knowledge Management in Research Reactors
||Important issue facing many organisations especially during decommissioning;
Sharing experience and management strategies;
May expedite adoption of new technologies;
|Need to focus on safety implications and avoid focus on IT tools;
May be too narrow field;
IAEACRP is considered closed but there may be ongoing program in IAEA;
|Ageing Management in Research Reactors
||Important issue given the age of many research reactors in the region;
Some similar reactor types (esp TRIGAs) in the regions allowing sharing of experience;
Although the necessary experts may not be available the peer review could encourage the request for specialist expert mission(s).
|Need to focus on safety implications;
Need to find specific experts;
Prompt action may be required that may be beyond the capability of an FNCA project.
|Operational Safety of Research Reactors
||Some continuity with current project;
Could cover a wider range of safety aspects;
|Possible overlap with IAEA INSARR service;
Possibly too broad (although scope could be specifically narrowed);
Some countries do not have operational research reactors.
|Safety Management Systems
||Some continuity with current project including review activities;
Could cover safety culture and safety aspects of knowledge management;
Well-established guidance (eg from IAEA) plus existing NSCP self assessment forms which could form the basis of the peer review;
Possibility of one year of feasibility study (either under existing or new project);
|Overlap with ANSN TG on SMSRR but interaction can be managed;
Specific outputs (beyond current project) need to be determined for safety management issues (self-assessment form is one output);
Another option is to combine these topics with the so that, for example, the main project theme is safety management systems, but each workshop has a special topic for consideration (such as ageing management) possibly with an invited expert presenting on that specific topic.
For all these options, the host country/institute needs to be ready to accept the peer review. As with the NSCP peer review process, it is not the intention to impose a review on member countries.
An outline of each proposal is given in the Final Project Report (Appendix 4).
- The FNCA Working Group on Safety Culture expressed its sincere thanks to the staff of Institute of Nuclear and new Energy Technology of Tsinghua University for their excellent arrangements.
- It was apparent that over the eleven years of the project, significant positive impacts had been made in the various countries and institutes to promote strong safety culture.
- The Group confirmed that there is strong commitment to furthering nuclear safety culture in the region and that the workshop and peer review process has provided an excellent opportunity for participants to learn from each other.
- It was agreed that the project had achieved its aims over the eleven year period, and that although further work can be achieved, it was timely to conclude the project.
- The Group agreed to recommend to the FNCA Coordinators that a replacement project be initiated following the completion of the Nuclear Safety Culture Project. Suggested topics discussed in this workshop (see table above and Appendix 3 below) may be useful for consideration. A one year feasibility study may be also an option.
Appendix 1: Participant List of the FNCA 2008 Workshop on Nuclear Safety Culture
Appendix 2: Agenda of the Workshop
Appendix 3: Survey responses
Appendix 4: Final Report of the FNCA Nuclear Safety Culture Project